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Abstract: We reexamine in this paper the role of globalization on top income shares (five classes 
from top 0.1% to top 10% of the income distribution) for a sample of 15 economies over the period 
1970-2004. We investigate financial globalization measures that complement trade openness. Our 
system GMM (SGMM) estimations allow for a robust treatment of the endogeneity between 
income concentration and GDP per capita (as well as with taxation or government size). We find 
two interesting new results. First, the financial integration measure based on portfolio equity and 
FDI stocks (GEQ) turns out to have a large impact on top income shares, suggesting that the 
channel through which globalization affects income concentration is through FDI/equity flows. 
Second, we find strong support for the progressivity of taxation: there is an almost one to one 
negative effect of higher tax on top income (top 0.1%), which declines monotonically until the top 
10% class.  
Keywords: Capital Inflows, Dynamic Panels, Globalization, Income Inequality. 





What makes income concentration increase at the top income shares in the more recent 
period when globalization forces are more visible? This paper attempts to answer this question 
revisiting the debate on globalization and inequality. While a burgeoning literature has blamed 
“globalization”, this concept has to be made more precise. Ravallion (2006) employs both macro 
(cross-country comparisons and aggregate time series data) and micro lens (household-level data 
combined with structural modeling of the specific impact of trade reforms) to question widely 
heard generalizations from both sides of the debate. As discussed by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, 
p. 41): “Research on the effects of globalization in economics has concentrated on those aspects 
of globalization that are easier to capture empirically. Accordingly, we confine our discussion on 
the more narrowly defined components of globalization: trade liberalization, outsourcing, flows of 
capital across borders in the form of FDI, and exchange rate shocks. Even when one hones in on a 
narrow dimension of globalization, measurement challenges abound…” 
In addition to a more careful treatment of globalization, some of the long-run determinants 
have to be present as “control variables” which admittedly have a role in explaining income 
inequality. Following early analysis by Kuznets (1955, pp. 7-8) on rural and urban populations, 
theoretical models of the structural transformation (progressive and stagnant sectors) have been 
developed by Rogerson (2008) and Blum (2008), among others. For the U.S., Blum (2008) finds 
that changes in the sector composition of the economy (from manufacturing to services and other 
non-tradable sectors) are the most important force behind the widening of the wage gap in the U.S. 
between 1970 and 1996, which has been confirmed by Mollick (2012) in the long-run from 1919 
to 2002. The substantial widening of the U.S. wage structure during the 1980s has been extensively 
documented by, e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992) and Beaudry and Green (2005), with Acemoglu 
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(2002) providing a review of theory and evidence. One way to characterize this body of work is 
through the “ongoing, secular rise in the demand for skill that commenced decades earlier and 
perhaps accelerated during the 1980s with the onset of the computer revolution. When this secular 
demand shift met with an abrupt slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of college-
equivalent workers during the 1980s … wage differentials expanded rapidly.” (Autor et al. 2008, 
p. 300).1 
Recent studies have increasingly focused on the experiences of other countries. Atkinson 
et al. (2011) review this vast literature from the viewpoint of long-run determinants of income 
distribution. Examining 20 countries in the very long-run, they report that top income shares over 
the last 30 years have increased substantially in English speaking countries and in India and China 
but not in continental European countries or Japan. They attribute this increase in part to an 
unprecedented surge in top wage incomes.2 Detailed country-by-country analyses are provided by 
Piketty and Saez (2003) for the U.S., Saez and Veall (2005) for Canada, Moriguchi and Saez 
(2008) for Japan, Leigh and van der Eng (2009) for Indonesia, and Gustafsson and Jansson (2008) 
for Sweden, among many others. 
The observed increase in wage inequality can be also a result of a progressive tax on 
income. However, the effect of marginal tax rates on top income inequality is far from clear due 
to the shifting effects to alternative income sources in order to avoid a more progressive taxation. 
 
1 In Piketty and Saez (2006, p. 204): “During the post-1970 period, one observes a major divergence between rich 
countries. While top income shares have remained fairly stable in continental European countries or Japan over the 
past three decades, they have increased enormously in the U.S. and other English-speaking countries. The rise of top 
income shares is due not to the revival of top capital incomes, but rather to the very large increases in top wages 
(especially top executive compensation).” 
2 Also Leigh (2007), using a standardized top income shares dataset for 13 developed countries, finds that there is a 
strong and significant relationship between top income shares and broader measures, such as the Gini coefficient. 
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Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) have documented shifting of income from profits to managerial 
wages after 1992 Indian reform, which had a significant impact on wage inequality. Lee and 
Gordon (2005) found also patterns of shifting in income in opposite direction. They provide 
evidence that a low corporate tax leads to a fall in personal income tax revenue. It seems that in 
such scenarios people reduce their time as employee, where income is subject to high personal tax, 
and instead become entrepreneurs, generating corporate tax revenue and reducing personal tax 
revenue. These shifting effects are not limited to individual decisions, since it has been 
documented that taxes can also play an important role in a firm’s choice of organizational form. 
Goolsbee (2004) using cross-sectional data on organizational form choices across states in the 
United States found that firms in states where corporate income tax is progressive are able to break 
up into multiple firms to keep the marginal taxes low. Intangible assets, like patents and 
trademarks, have also been recognized as a major source of profit shifting opportunities. 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011) using data on European multinational enterprises found that the 
lower a subsidiary’s corporate tax rate relative to other affiliates of the multinational group the 
higher is its level of intangible asset investment. 
This paper revisits the globalization and income concentration debate. The closest paper to 
ours is Roine et al. (2009), who adopted a long-run approach to inequality determinants. We do 
have at least three important modifications, however, ranging from the research question to 
methodological issues. First, Roine et al. (2009) used the conventional measure of openness 
(imports plus exports divided by GDP), which is admittedly restrictive given that the economies 
have also developed the financial system throughout the period. In addition to trade openness, we 
also use in this paper the measures of financial development developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007) on assets and liabilities of capital account transactions, including equity, bonds, debt and 
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other financial instruments. The gain associated with the usage of these measures is that they cover 
a wide range of financial transactions that became available to financial institutions and 
individuals, thus expanding the more conventional trade channel. This approach also helps 
verifying the channel put forward recently by Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011), who examine a 
world where entrepreneurs set up firms abroad: Depending on the degree of globalization, they 
may choose to run a firm in the foreign country, thus clarifying the FDI-inequality channel. As a 
result, globalization increases inequality at the top of the distribution. Due to the use of these new 
measures of globalization, in order to make the analysis compatible with data availability, the time 
span in this paper starts in 1970. 3,4 
Second, our study emphasizes the connection between inequality and openness to trade or 
financial flows. It is obvious that income inequality is inherently linked to growth opportunities, 
which makes it important to frame properly the long-run determinants of growth. Calderón and 
Chong (2001) have used dynamic panels for 1960-1995 for regressions of the Gini coefficient on 
a vector of variables for the external sector (volume and terms of trade, real exchange rate, black 
market premium, and capital controls). They argue that some of these variables have affected the 
distribution of income in the long-run: e.g., a 10% real depreciation of local currency helps 
decrease income inequality by 0.9 points. It is also very likely that the impact of trade openness 
on growth depends on the complementary reforms undertaken as documented by Chang et al. 
 
3 Roine et al. (2009, p. 981) attempt to remedy the deficiency of not capturing financial development with two fixes; 
both are - at best - only partially successful as they acknowledge: “Since our approach here is to take an agnostic view 
on several potential explanations for top incomes over a long period, instrumentation is not feasible for all variables. 
However, when estimating the impact of internationalization we will rely on both de facto and de jure measures of 
openness. In order to get at the impact of financial development, we will both use direct measures and analyze the 
effects of banking crisis on top income shares. Neither of these approaches is ideal so we cannot claim to establish 
causality…” 




(2009). Using the ratio of the sum of world trade to the sum of world GDP and capital flows (as 
measured by the ratio of the sum of the absolute values of the current account gap to the sum of 
world GDP), Dutt and Mukhopadhyay (2005) estimate Granger causality tests and impulse 
response functions for the years 1977 – 1998 and found that these globalization measures cause an 
increase in the inequality of per capita GDP across nations. Heyman et al. (2007) compare foreign 
owned firms with domestic multinationals and local firms in Sweden to question previous results 
at a more aggregate level on a foreign ownership wage premium. Tomohara and Takii (2011) also 
find wage spill overs benefits in the Indonesian manufacturing industry for the years 1989-1996. 
For their sample of 65 developing countries over the 1980-1999 period the results by Meschi and 
Vivarelli (2009) suggest that trade with high income countries worsens income distribution in 
developing countries. Baltagi et al. (2009) find evidence that both trade and financial openness 
measures are statistically significant determinants of private credit, a measure of banking sector 
development. 
Third, the methodology employed herein to verify the link between income concentration 
and its determinants is fundamentally different from Roine et al. (2009), who used a first-
differenced approach based on generalized least squares (FDGLS). The problem with the latter is 
its inability to handle endogeneity issues and we attempt to remedy this with system generalized 
methods of moments (SGMM). Since we have as control variables income per capita and series 
related to the public sector (such as top marginal tax and government share of GDP), it is likely 
that income inequality may also cause these control variables to change over time, which casts 
doubt on the one-way causality implicit in the FDGLS methodology.5  For example, because 
 
5 Roine et al. (2009, p. 981) argue that “these GMM-procedures are not appropriate in a setting with small N and large 
T.” In our case, because T is not so large (we do capture financial globalization with post-1970 data) this technical 
point is overcome. More importantly, we are able to handle the endogeneity problem mentioned above with the SGMM 
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income is too concentrated at the top, government may decide to increase taxation on the rich as 
well as to allocate more discretionary spending to classes at the bottom of the distribution. Income 
concentration may have a clear impact on GDP growth and on investment share ratios, as well. 
Forbes (2000), for example, documents that an increase in a country’s level of income inequality 
has a significant positive (and fairly robust) relationship with subsequent economic growth. 
Voitchovsky (2005) uses household surveys - under dynamic panels - and finds that inequality at 
the top end of the distribution is positively associated with growth and inequality at the bottom of 
distribution is negatively associated with economic growth. From those perspectives, one may 
seriously question the adequacy of having per capita income as exogenous. In addition, theoretical 
work in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) provides an articulated view that financial 
intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return on capital, while growth 
in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures. This implies a two-way 
causation between growth and financial structures. Brückner et al. (2010) examine the experience 
of U.S., U.K., and Sweden over 70 years to conclude that decreases in wealth inequality lead to 
significant declines in real interest rates. Herzer and Vollmer (2013) find in a panel of nine high-
income countries during 1961-1996 that causality runs in both directions. This body of work makes 
clear the link from income concentration to output as consistent with a reverse causation 
mechanism, which require an alternative approach to Roine et al. (2009). Claessens and Perotti 
(2007) provide an extensive review of financial development and inequality.  
With these motivations, we re-examine in this paper the role of globalization on top income 
shares (five classes from top 0.1% to top 10% of the income distribution) for a sample of 15 
 
procedure by allowing the degree of income concentration to have an effect on economic growth as reviewed by 
Forbes (2000) and many others. 
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economies over the period 1970-2004. Our system GMM (SGMM) estimations allow for a more 
robust treatment of the endogeneity between income concentration and GDP per capita (as well as 
with taxation or government size) than first-differenced generalized least squares (FDGLS). We 
find three interesting new results. The financial integration measure based on portfolio equity and 
FDI stocks (GEQ) turns out to have much larger impacts on top income shares, suggesting that the 
channel through which globalization affects income concentration is through either FDI or equity 
flows. We also find support for the progressivity of taxation: there is an almost one to one negative 
effect of higher tax on top income (top 0.1%), which declines monotonically until the top 10% 
class. And when we split the sample into GEQ below and above (panel) averages, we do find 
positive coefficients for GEQ on income concentration: for relatively low levels of financial 
globalization increases in GEQ lead to very strong effects on income concentration at the very rich 
households. 
The rest of paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the data and Section 3 
introduces the models and methodology employed. The results of the empirical estimations appear 
in Section 4 and Section 5 gives some policy recommendations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
article.  
 
2. The Data  
 
We explore the effects of globalization on top income shares employing the dataset 
compiled by Roine et al. (2009). We have information for a total of fifteen economies in our 
sample: twelve developed countries (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States) and three developing 
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economies (Argentina, China and India) between 1970 and 2004. To observe the role of financial 
globalization, we construct a couple of measures of financial globalization based on the Milesi-
Ferreti and Lane (2007) dataset.  
Our first measure of globalization is the traditional trade openness (TO), which is 
calculated as total trade, the sum of exports and imports, over GDP. Following Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), we construct two alternative measures of financial globalization. First, a measure 
of international financial integration (IFI) with respect to GDP: IFIit = (FAit + FLit)/GDPit, where: 
FA (FL) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities). Second, a financial integration measure 
also with respect to GDP as an indicator of the level of equity (portfolio and FDI) cross-holding: 
GEQit = (PEQAit + FDIAit + PEQLit +FDILit)/GDPit, where: PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock of 
portfolio equity assets and FDIA (FDIL) denotes the stock of their direct investment assets 
(liabilities). 
Our main variables of interest, the top income shares, are based on personal income tax 
data bases. These indicators can be compared relatively easily across countries, yet some 
limitations should be borne in mind and great care is required when conducting data analysis over 
time and across countries (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2009).  Since countries under analysis have 
established their income tax systems at different point in times and follow different changes in 
their income tax law according to countries’ specific needs, we cannot expect the series to be 
homogeneous. This certainly affects comparability over time and across countries. However, an 
argument that favors this type of comparison was given by Roine et al. (2009) by noticing that the 
composition of income distribution varies across the distribution. They found that labor income 
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dominates the lower deciles of the distribution while capital incomes dominate the top percentile 
which gives some homogeneity in the income composition at the top of the distribution.6 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the 15 economies in our sample. According 
to Leigh (2007), the top income shares represent alternative measures of income inequality with a 
strong and significant correlation with other inequality measures. We observe significant 
variability in the concentration of income across countries and for each particular top income share. 
For instance, across the sample, people at the top 1% of the distribution concentrate on average 
7.83% of the total income. In countries like Argentina, the United States, and Germany the top 1% 
of the distribution controls more than 10% of total income while less than 5% in China, Finland 
and Sweden. Figures 1 and 2 show, respectively, the evolution of the 1% top income share for each 
of the countries in the sample and for the other top income shares along with a fitted trend line. 
The upward trend in top income remains strong across the 1970-2004 period. 
Also in Table 1, China has the largest average population and the United States the highest 
per capita income. A variable with considerable impact on income inequality, the top marginal tax 
is on average equal to 0.54 or 54%. It shows, however, considerable variation across the sample 
with Sweden having the largest average marginal tax (70%) and Argentina the lowest (38%). 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the top 1% share along with the top marginal tax for each of the 
countries in the sample. Although they move in different scales, the negative association of the 
two series is evident; this is true even for Argentina that has a significant gap from the mid-1970s 
 
6 Atkinson and Leigh (2010) overcome these problems of comparability in the income variable by selecting a group 
of five countries with similar backgrounds, whilst the variables of their research are focused on the relationship 
between taxes and top income shares. We pursue a different approach here since we are interested on the relationship 
of top income shares with a broad set of development variables related with trade and openness. Our interest on this 
set of variables also justifies our selection of 12 developed countries and 3 developing countries according to the 
different hypotheses being tested. 
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to the mid-1990s. In Table 1, as expected, government spending follows the same trend than the 
marginal tax variable: with an average government spending to GDP ratio of 17%, Sweden shows 
the largest proportion (27%) and Argentina the lowest (13%). 
We also build a proxy for structural transformation in order to account for the effect of 
tertiarization on top income inequality. From the different variables associated to tertiarization we 
could gather, the ratio of service value added to GDP was the most complete series available from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Across the sample the average ratio of 
service value added is nearly 58% of GDP with the United States (68.4%) and France (67.3%) at 
the top of the ranking and China (29.7%) and India (43.6%) at the bottom. 
Finally, with respect to globalization, we reexamine the role of trade openness (TO) as 
measured by Roine et al. (2009) and explore the role of our two alternative measures of financial 
international integration (IFI and GEQ). In Table 1, the economies with the highest trade openness 
indexes are Ireland (with nearly 100% of its GDP), Canada (58.8%) and Sweden (57.1%); those 
countries with the lower level of trade openness are Argentina (13.5%), Japan (15.2%) and the 
U.S. (16.6%). For financial globalization, the ranking at the top and bottom is quite similar for IFI 
and GEQ, with Ireland and the U.K. presenting the highest indexes and India and Japan the lowest.  
Despite the similarity in the ranking of the two financial openness indexes, Table 2 
indicates that both financial indexes are not perfectly correlated and covary differently with other 
explanatory variables: TO correlates negatively (but very weakly) with top income shares and 
usually mildly with the other series; and IFI and GEQ correlates positively with top income shares 
and also mildly with the other series. While TO correlates more strongly with either IFI (0.52) or 
GEQ (0.63), these never enter the estimations jointly. Finally, a variable to capture the structural 
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transformation of the economy (service value added) correlates strongly with GDP per capita 
(0.90) and we will proceed using the latter in the estimations as discussed below. 
 
3. The Hypothesis and Estimation Strategies 
 One way to interpret the link between top income concentration and globalization is under 
the theoretical construction by Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011), who examine a world where 
entrepreneurs are allowed to set up firms abroad, especially on investments at establishing 
production facilities in a foreign country in order to serve the local market by making use of the 
local workforce. When comparing how individuals with different values of talent (a) fare in steady-
state of a world characterized by different values of globalization (c), they suggest a 3-type 
classification of agents: with little talent (a < threshold L); with intermediate talent (threshold L ≤ 
a ≤ threshold H); and with high-talent (a > threshold H). For the latter, in particular, they obtain 
the following result: “agents in the high-talent (a > threshold H) are always domestic 
entrepreneurs, and all run a domestic firm whose profits decrease with globalization. Depending 
on the degree of globalization, they may choose to run a firm in the foreign country as well, whose 
profits are instead increasing in the degree of globalization. Thus, highly talented agents gain from 
an increase in globalization only if the foreign gains are larger than the domestic losses. Clearly, 
this cannot be the case for the agents with a relatively low level of talent, as their level of foreign 
operations is either small or zero…”  Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011, p. 100). In this set-up, other 
than workers, only the agents at the very top of the distribution may win from globalization. The 
reason is that because the benefits from an increase in globalization are larger the larger the size 
of the foreign subsidiary, which in turn increases with talent. 
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The empirical models in this paper allow for these insights and combine elements from the 
public finance approach to taxation and the structural transformation hypothesis. The general 
equation to be tested is as follows: 
 
TOP INCOME SHAREit = f (TOPMGTAXit, GDP per capitait,  
GLOBALIZATIONit, Zit) + it (1), 
 
for i = 1 to 15 countries and t = 1970 to 2004 and where: TOP INCOME SHARE is the share of 
income associated with either top 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 5%, or 10% of households. TOPMGTAX is 
the top marginal tax rate on the wealthiest individuals. Research by Piketty (2005) on income 
distribution in the long-run for over 20 countries and for most of the 20th century emphasizes the 
role of progressive taxation in income concentration. We expect the response of top income share 
to TOPMGTAX to be negative and for progressivity to exist a larger negative effect as we move 
towards higher income shares. GDP per capita captures the income-inequality link in Forbes 
(2000). Early research by Kuznets (1955) linked the structural transformation of the economy 
(from rural to urban populations) to income inequality. Despite our interest in capturing this effect, 
due to the high correlation between the two series, we prefer to focus on GDP per capita rather 
than service value added, since GDP per capita is more commonly used in related studies. There 
is a well-researched (and mixed) relationship between economic growth and income inequality. 
Andrews et al. (2011) pool data for the Twentieth Century in the long-run for 12 developed nations 
and estimate by fixed effects models GDP growth as function of top income share and lagged GDP 
and find no relationship between top income shares and economic growth. However, when looking 
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at post-1960 data only, they find that a one percentage point rise in top decile’s income share is 
associated with a robust 0.12 point rise in GDP during the following year. The context of causality 
in their paper is from top income shares to economic growth as in Forbes (2000), which reinforces 
the reverse causation mechanism to be dealt with in this paper. GLOBALIZATION includes any 
of the three variables (TO, IFI, or GEQ) discussed in Section 2. Finally, Z is a vector of control 
variables including population growth and government spending ratio to GDP; and  is the white-
noise error.7 
The key point of this paper is how globalization (measured by either TO, IFI, or GEQ) 
affects income inequality at the top income shares. Globalization may have a direct or indirect 
impact on income inequality. In order to assess the former channel, it is interesting to contrast the 
conventional trade-related (TO) measures of globalization in the previous section to alternatives 
that allow for portfolio capital flows such as IFI or GEQ. If the latter effect is in any way different 
from the one under trade openness, there might be evidence that the FDI-type mechanism 
scrutinized in Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011) has a role in income inequality. It is also possible 
that globalization has no direct effects but can be seen through alternative routes. The literature on 
“profit shifting” and international tax competition by Dischinger and Riedel (2011) emphasizes 
the role of tax havens. It is thus possible that globalization may not have a direct impact on 
inequality but may be particularly effective through the domestic taxation channel. Top income 
earners are very heterogeneous (CEOs of firms, rentiers, etc.) and their income may vary more or 
less with foreign factors. For example, capital income may vary more with international factors 
 
7 Chamon and Kremer (2009) show that widespread prosperity can occur with small differences in population growth 
rates between advanced and developing countries. It is well known than an increase in G/Y (other than war or defense 
related build-up) can be associated with welfare programs, thus reducing income inequality. 
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than labor income, which is subject to marginal tax rates. As long as firms find ways to avoid being 
taxed internationally, more progressive taxation can have more pronounced effects and thus affect 
income inequality through the coefficient of TOPMGTAX. 
 With the discussion above as theoretical reference, we start our analysis taking as 
benchmark the basic first difference model employed by Roine et al. (2009) to evaluate top income 
inequality determinants: 
 Yit =  Yit-1 + Xit  + i + t + it                          (2), 
where: Y stand for any of our five top income shares (the top 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5% and 0.1%). In 
X we have a vector of one of our globalization measures and control variables also employed by 
Roine et al (2009) which include: population, GDP per capita, top marginal tax and central 
government spending divided by GDP. Finally,  and  are, respectively, vectors of country and 
time effects. 
The most appropriate method to estimate the model in equation (2) is the difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (DGMM) procedures proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Under DGMM procedures, lagged differences of the dependent variable are instrumented with 
suitable lags of their own. Roine et al (2009) notice that due to the characteristics of their data set, 
in which T (about 100 years) is significantly larger than N (16 countries), the use of DGMM 
procedures was inappropriate to estimate (2). Indeed, DGMM and System GMM (SGMM) 
methods were designed to work with short time dimension since the number of instrument grow 
quadratically in T, biasing the typical test of overidentification. As a result of these limitations, 
Roine et al. (2009) decided to estimate a static specification that does not include the lagged first 
difference of top income shares on the right hand side as follows: 
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 Yit =  Xit  + i + t + it                           (3) 
Some potential problems arising while estimating equation (3) are those of 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation of the residuals, and endogeneity. In order to control for the 
first of these problems, Roine et al (2009) estimate equation (3) using Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) methods which allow for heteroskedasticity.  
We start our analysis reproducing the results in (3) but augmenting the specification to 
control for openness by including each of our three measures of globalization (TO, IFE and GEQ), 
while allowing for heteroskedasticity and first order serial correlation employing GLS methods. 
In dealing with the problem of endogeneity we follow, however, a different estimation approach 
and modify our dataset accordingly. We employ SGMM procedures using the xtabond2 STATA 
command developed by Roodman (2009). In order to avoid the proliferation of instruments while 
using SGMM we follow three strategies. First, we focus our analysis on the effects of globalization 
over the period 1970-2004; this greatly reduces the time dimension effect in our estimations. 
Second, for each country dataset we take three-year averages of all variables (T=12).8 Dynamic 
panels with annual data were also estimated but due to the propagation of instruments (as verified 
by the Hansen test), they lead to over-identification problems of the estimated models. Third, we 
collapse the maximum number of lags by creating only one instrument for each variable and lag 
distance, instead of one for each time period. 
To facilitate the interpretation of coefficients, we estimate the models in logs rather than in 
first differences. The model to be estimated is: 
 
8 This follows from work on growth regressions which typically use year averages to remove business cycle effects. 
A recent example of measuring the effects of government size on output growth in yearly panels versus average data 
panels is provided by Mollick and Cabral (2011) for two samples of industrial and emerging market economies.  
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 yit =  yit-1 + xit  + i + t + it                          (4), 
where small letters represent logs. An additional advantage of employing SGMM is that we are 
able to address the potential endogeneity of some of our control variables: GDP per capita, central 
government spending and top marginal tax. Because controlling for all of the potential endogenous 




4.1 Static models 
Table 3 presents the estimations of the static benchmark model under fifteen different 
specifications. We estimate (3) for the five top income shares (top 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
of the distribution) and for every income share we control for the influence of our three measures 
of globalization (TO, IFI or GEQ) separately. For most of our control variables we find the 
expected signs and statistical significance at least at the 10% level. We observe a positive and 
statistically significant but declining (as we go from top 10% to top 0.1%) contribution of 
population growth to income inequality. Population growth has the largest and most significant 
effect on inequality at the top 10% class but it declines in size and significance as we move ahead 
in the distribution. At the top 0.1%, the influence of population is the smallest and its coefficients 
are not statistically significant. 
The top marginal tax and the central government spending show both, as expected, negative 
and statistically significant influence on top income inequality in all our specifications. On the one 
hand, the top marginal tax presents not only a very strong statistical significance (at the 1% level) 
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in every regression but interestingly also a declining tendency in the size of the coefficients as one 
moves ahead on the distribution (towards the top 10%). Despite targeting the wealthiest, the top 
marginal tax is less progressive, or rather regressive, at higher income levels. On the other hand, 
in spite of its lower statistical significance, a similar trend can be observed for central government 
spending which seems to be more effective at reducing income concentration at top 5% or top 10% 
income shares than at relatively higher shares. The effect of government spending at reducing 
income concentration is on average two to three times higher at the top 10% of the distribution 
than at the 0.1%. 
GDP per capita is the less consistent of our control variables. For this variable we observe 
only a positive and significant effect at the top 0.1% of the distribution. As economic growth 
increases, there is an increase in top 0.1% share only, and only at the 10% level. This result on 
GDP per capita contrasts to Roine et al. (2009), who reported positive coefficients for top 1% share 
in the long-run. Finally, with respect to our three globalization variables, in contrast to previous 
estimates by Roine et al. (2009), we find positive and statistically significant effects of trade 
openness (TO) on top income shares, with larger coefficients for top 5% and top 10% income 
shares. This might be happening because we focus our analysis in post-1970 data, a period with 
greater openness to trade than in their more comprehensive and historical larger sample. As with 
trade openness, our two measures of financial openness (IFI and GEQ) have a positive and 
significant influence on top income shares. Only the IFI coefficient at the top 10% income share 
shows the expected sign but is not statistically significant. In general, there is a higher impact of 
overall financial globalization (by the IFI measure) on top income shares than on trade openness. 
More importantly, the effects of the portfolio equity and FDI stocks (by the GEQ measure) on 
income concentration are consistently positive at all top income classes with a closer to one 
19 
 
coefficient for top 5% (0.924) and top 10% (0.815). This is evidence supportive of the FDI-based 
channel developed by Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011). 
Overall, these static results present a considerable fit, with a pseudo R2 ranging from 26% 
to 36%. They also differ with previous results in the literature. In particular, with respect to the 
role of trade openness on income inequality previously judged as not significant and in regard to 
the effect of financial integration not previously explored before. Our analysis gives account of 
significant positive effects of trade openness and financial globalization on top income shares. 
Nonetheless, a potential problem that remains in these estimates is that of endogeneity. In what 
follows we instrument the potential endogenous variables employing SGMM techniques. 
 
4.2 Dynamic models 
Following the results of the static benchmark model, we proceed in this section with the 
estimation of the dynamic model proposed in (4) using one step SGMM procedures as proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998). For these estimates we consider GDP per capita, the top income tax 
and government spending divided by GDP as endogenous. In Table 4 we report the regression 
results controlling for the endogeneity of GDP per capita.9 In this specification, we allow for the 
possibility that top income shares have feedback effects on GDP growth. Along with the 
regressors, we report at the bottom of Table 4 the required tests to check the validity of instruments: 
 
9 Estimates controlling for the endogeneity of top marginal tax and central government spending are not qualitatively 




the Hansen test of overidentifying restriction and the second order autocorrelation test. In addition, 
the standard errors reported in parenthesis are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
The null hypothesis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions implies that the 
instruments employed are valid. In addition, moment conditions are valid only if there is no second 
order serial correlation in the residuals. Hence, rejecting the null of no second order autocorrelation 
(and thus of further orders) would also imply that the model specification is not properly specified. 
For all the regressions in Table 4 the Hansen test and the second order autocorrelation tests suggest 
the identified restrictions are valid.10 
At least three interesting results can be observed in Table 4. First, once we control for the 
persistence of income inequality and the endogeneity of the GDP per capita, only the top marginal 
tax remains a significant determinant across all top income shares. Most importantly, the negative 
impact of taxation on income concentration is reverted and presents now an increasing monotonic 
effect as one move ahead in the distribution. As a result, a 1% increase in the top marginal tax 
leads to decline of around 0.8% in the top 0.1% top income share but only to roughly 0.17% of the 
top 10% income share. In contrast to the estimates of the static model, this result supports the 
progressivity of taxation. Interestingly, progressive taxation occurs despite the possible income 
shifting effect previously documented in other studies. 
Second, looking at the significance of our three globalization variables, we observe that, in 
contrast to the static estimates but consistently with Roine et al. (2009) results, trade openness 
(TO) is not a significant determinant for any of the five top income shares under consideration. As 
for our proxies of financial globalization, we find a less consistent pattern of significance for IFI, 
 
10 Only in the case of the top 10% income share the null of no second order autocorrelation can be rejected at the 10% 
significance level. For all the other columns the null cannot be rejected at this significance level. 
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which has only positive effects on income concentration at the top 0.5% and 1%, and a more steady 
significance for GEQ which presents positive effects on income concentration from four of the 
income classes up to the top 5% class. The reason behind this might be the more comprehensive 
inclusion of financial assets included in GEQ. The largest effect is found for the GEQ coefficient 
on top 0.1% share at 0.186 and statistically significant at 5% the level. As in Table 3, the effects 
of the portfolio equity and FDI stocks (the GEQ measure) have positive effects on top income 
shares, yet the magnitudes of the coefficients are much smaller in Table 4 under SGMM. This 
suggests that the Table 3 results on the degree of financial integration were biased upwards.  
Third, GDP per capita has a positive impact and is only statistically significant in one of 
our fifteen specifications in Table 4: column (13). Despite being not statistically relevant, for 
twelve occurrences the coefficient is even negative. Similar results are found when we treat all our 
regressors as exogenous or when we consider the top marginal tax and the central government 
expenditure, respectively, as endogenous. In contrast to the findings by Roine et al. (2009) and to 
our own results in Table 3 for the top 0.1%, our dynamic panel estimates suggest that economic 
growth has no effect on top income inequality. These results also contrast with other studies 
[Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Perotti (1992), Ram (1997), and Mo (2000) among others] that relate 
inequality to economic growth and found a negative and significant relationship between GDP per 
capita and inequality. On this regard, Bourguignon and Morrison (1998) find a great deal of 
variability in this relationship depending on sample compositions and period of analysis. The 
estimates reported in Table 4, controlling for the persistence of inequality in equation (4), suggest 
that the association between top income inequality and GDP per capita, while negative in most 
cases, results not statistically significant. 
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In order to explore the effects of financial globalization in more depth, in Table 5 we 
partition the sample in two in accordance with the degree of financial openness observed by the 
GEQ index of each economy above and below the sample’s GEQ average (0.46). Using this cut-
off for GEQ, we have seven economies above the panel average and eight below it. We re-estimate 
(4) for two top income shares: top 0.1% (columns (1) to (6)) and top 1% (columns (7) to (12)). As 
in our previous results for dynamic panels, the top marginal tax is negative and statistically 
significant in each regression. Trade openness and some other explanatory variables remain not 
significant across the different subsamples. For both top income shares in Table 5, we observe that 
a GEQ index below average results in positive and statistically significant effects on the two top 
income shares but we do not observe the same results for the estimates of GEQ above average. 
This implies that when financial openness is low financial openness leads to further income 
concentration. We find a similar impact for IFI across the top 0.1% of the distribution for the panel 
with GEQ below average. 
A limitation of the above results in Table 5 is that while the number of instruments 
employed in each regression has been restricted, serial correlation tests do not detect second order 
autocorrelation and Hansen tests do not reject the null of valid restrictions, for the latter test there 
is evidence of p-value close to one in some columns. Subject to this caveat caused by the reduction 
in the number of observations, we note that the impact of marginal tax rate is higher on top income 
shares for cases when GEQ is above the panel average. For the panels when the degree of financial 
integration is higher, higher taxes on the very rich lead to a more significant reduction in income 
concentration at the top. At the same time, the coefficient on GEQ is not statistically significant: 
there is no impact from the globalization measures. Taken together, these threshold effects of 
financial openness suggest that for relatively low levels of FDI and stocks, increases in financial 
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globalization leads to fairly robust higher income concentration at the top 0.1% (0.286 coefficient 
on GEQ) and 1%. (0.139 coefficient on GEQ). As in the static panel case, this is evidence 
supportive of the FDI-based channel developed by Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011). One possible 
interpretation is that, for high levels of financial openness (captured by GEQ), globalization has 
no impact because of tax havens and the ability of profit shifting by firms reported by Dischinger 
and Riedel (2011). At the individual level, taxation of capital income is not the key, the impact of 
taxation on top income shares is more pronounced by domestic components, as the one captured 
by the TOPMGTAX rate. 
 
5. Policy recommendations 
There is a widespread view that the most effective instrument for achieving faster economic 
growth and the reduction of inequalities among countries is the integration of world economies 
through globalization. In the case of top income inequalities, we find evidence that globalization, 
measured as openness to foreign capital (FDI or equity flows) increases income concentration at 
the top. It is clear that international efforts to build a more equitable society have not been 
successful and part of the problem has been the inability to understand the real drivers behind 
increasing inequality, particularly at the top. There is, however, an opportunity in policy design 
that could bring about a correct path in the distribution of income and preventing extreme 
inequality. The question then becomes the relative impact of tax collection or government 
expenditures on redistribution policies. 
According to our results, increasing marginal tax rates is an important instrument in 
reducing inequality. Nevertheless, policy responses should be carefully tailored in order to avoid 
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taxes to be shifted to other members of the society and the way tax burden is distributed. In some 
cases, highly progressive taxes discourage people from entering high-paying professions; in 
response, salaries in these professions will be higher than otherwise. Therefore, taxes paid by the 
upper-income taxpayers who do enter these professions overstate the true burden of taxation to 
them. In other situations, the upper income individuals have a financial incentive to report their 
incomes in ways that limit their tax liabilities (Burkhauser, et al., 2012). Fiscal manipulation 
strategies are sensitive to changes in marginal tax rates, in which people face incentives in 
reclassifying income as either wage earnings or business profits depending on which is taxed less; 
hence reducing the effect of progressive taxation. As for OECDs, VATs and other taxes account 
for a larger share than personal income and Schoenfeld (2015) claims that “the income-tax rate is 
a subpar proxy for redistribution policy. For example, from 1990-2010 the average marginal 
income-tax rate within the OECD was cut to 44.9% from 50.6%. But the average VAT was raised 
to 18% from 16.7%, largely offsetting the cut with respect to revenue generation.” 
It is also important to pay more attention to the taxation of wealth, since wealth compounds 
and then the advantage of top income individuals builds on itself. High top rate of taxation on the 
transmission of wealth by inheritance and gift, reduce the capacity of large wealth holders to 
sustain a disproportionate increase in income. Alvaredo et al. (2013) points out that a key factor in 
determining the capacity to transmit wealth is the difference between the internal rate of 
accumulation and the rate of growth of the economy, and for that taxation of income and wealth 
transfers can cause the share of the top income individuals to fall. 
While our results suggest that government spending has only a role on inequality when we 
do not take into consideration the persistence in inequality (i.e. employing static panel data 
methods), its impact is actually larger than that of taxation, particularly at the top 10% of the 
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income distribution under GLS methods. Government expenditures through welfare state have had 
a major role in reducing inequality in the past. According to the OECD (2011), the reduction in 
the redistributive capacity of the governments between mid-1990 and 2005 was sometimes the 
main source of increasing poverty and inequality. OECD data find that public spending on 
education, health and family care reduces inequality by about a fifth on average and that 
government should be responsible for this (Gurría, 2011). It is therefore important to improve the 
efficiency of public expenditure and social safety nets which calls for policies that sustain and 
enhance social expenditure levels and a more effective targeting of transfers geared towards the 
poor. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The recently proposed theoretical model by Pica and Rodríguez Mota (2011) supports the 
link between openness to foreign capital (through FDI and investment abroad) and income 
inequality and find an intriguing relationship: the very rich and the very poor benefit mostly from 
openness to foreign capital, not the ones located in the middle of the distribution. We conduct in 
this paper an empirical investigation of this “foreign capital-top income share channel” operating 
abroad combined with progressive taxation at home. 
Our major results are as follows for our sample of 15 economies over the period 1970-
2004. We find three interesting new results under the preferred SGMM approach. The GEQ 
financial integration measure based on portfolio equity and FDI stocks turns out to have much 
larger impacts on top income shares, suggesting that the channel through which globalization 
affects income concentration is through either FDI or equity flows. We also find support for the 
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progressivity of taxation: there is an almost one to one negative effect of higher tax on top income 
(top 0.1%), which declines monotonically until the top 10% class. And when we split the sample 
into GEQ below and above (panel) averages, we do find positive coefficients for GEQ on income 
concentration: for relatively low levels of financial globalization increases in GEQ lead to very 
strong effects on income concentration at the very rich households (top 0.1%). This is the direct 
channel of globalization, in which the domestic taxation also has negative effects on top income 
shares. On the other hand, for relatively high levels of financial globalization increases in GEQ 
have muted effects on income concentration of the top 0.1% households, while the domestic 
taxation of income has much larger negative effects on top income shares. One possible 
interpretation is profit shifting: for countries with highly integrated capital account systems 
globalization has only an indirect effect on income concentration through the taxation of capital 
and labor income of the rich at home. This pattern also holds for the top 1% of households for the 
GEQ variable of globalization.  
The behavior of the share of the top income depends on both what is happening to the 
distribution between rich and poor and to the distribution among the rich (Atkinson, 2004). At 
central role are the tax policy and the associated trade-off between efficiency of income 
redistribution. From the efficiency side, marginal tax rate should be zero at the top and at the 
bottom of the income distribution (Mirrlees, 1971). That is, the optimal tax system cannot be a 
fully (marginal rate) progressive one. The outcome in terms of policy results is summarized by 
Meltzer (2012) as follows: “policies that redistribute wealth and income have at most a modest 
effect on top income shares. As President John F. Kennedy often said, the better way is ‘a rising 
tide that lifts all boats’ ”. This view is partially challenged by the results in this paper, in which we 
find strong support for the progressivity of taxation at the top income share and substantiate with 
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recent results in Herzer and Wollmer (2013), who find that the effect of an increase in top income 
shares on economic growth is negative. Data limitations preclude our analysis to be performed for 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix. 














Argentina          6.83           13.92           18.69           30.77     .                 31.6                 7,747             0.38                    0.13              54.59           13.47             0.76             0.16    
Australia          1.69             4.16             6.29           17.44           27.74                    16.3               16,529             0.55                    0.18              61.82           31.58             0.95             0.49    
Canada          2.68             6.33             9.25           23.83           37.11                    26.9               17,634             0.55                    0.20              63.33           58.82             1.37             0.63    
China          0.73             2.44             4.12           13.52           22.38               1,081.3                 1,888             0.45                    0.13              29.66           35.52             0.35             0.11    
Finland          0.91     .          4.21           13.23           21.88                      4.9               14,675             0.46                    0.20              57.53           50.10             1.35             0.44    
France          1.97     .          7.86           20.93           32.07                    55.8               16,764             0.60                    0.21              67.29           37.65             1.50             0.52    
Germany          3.88             7.68           10.34           22.30           32.64                    79.7               15,343             0.55                    0.19              60.55           43.36             1.22             0.29    
India          2.41             5.49             7.49     .  .               795.2                 1,262             0.48                    0.11              43.57           17.78             0.30             0.04    
Ireland          1.82             4.65             7.24     .        32.18                      3.5               11,943             0.58                    0.16              53.77           99.95             4.66             1.49    
Japan          1.73             4.81             7.47           21.12     .               119.8               16,189             0.59                    0.13              58.74           15.20             0.69             0.11    
New Zealand          1.73             4.84             7.34           19.65           30.65                      3.4               13,875             0.48                    0.17              62.57           52.21             1.16             0.46    
Spain          2.12             5.37             8.18           22.31           34.04                    38.2               11,030             0.58                    0.15              59.53           34.01             0.97             0.31    
Sweden          1.09             3.13             4.93           15.18           24.75                      8.5               16,484             0.70                    0.27              64.62           57.18             1.65             0.71    
United Kindgom          2.35             5.71             8.43           21.66           33.20                    57.5               15,282             0.57                    0.20              63.29           41.56             3.53             0.84    
United States          3.91             8.10           11.18           25.01           36.76                  246.1               21,574             0.44                    0.16              68.37           16.59             0.82             0.37    




























TO IFI GEQ 
Top 0.1% 1.000                         
Top 0.5%  0.987 1.000                       
Top 1% 0.970 0.996 1.000                     
Top 5% 0.883 0.938 0.963 1.000                   
Top 10% 0.813 0.879 0.913 0.987 1.000                 
Population -0.165 -0.206 -0.223 -0.286 -0.320 1.000               
GDP per capita 0.632 0.628 0.618 0.598 0.583 -0.563 1.000             
Top Marginal Tax -0.497 -0.516 -0.513 -0.473 -0.427 -0.278 -0.228 1.000           
Government Spending -0.184 -0.206 -0.224 -0.234 -0.221 -0.515 0.316 0.473 1.000         
Service Value Added 0.503 0.532 0.541 0.576 0.577 -0.724 0.902 -0.143 0.424 1.000       
TO -0.083 -0.070 -0.076 -0.056 -0.047 -0.108 0.044 -0.072 0.405 0.157 1.000     
IFI 0.244 0.267 0.269 0.298 0.285 -0.206 0.345 -0.239 0.323 0.422 0.519 1.000   
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
 of population 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.011** 0.010** 0.009* 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 0.030*** 0.028** 0.028**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
 top marginal tax -1.229*** -1.223*** -1.106*** -2.594*** -2.539*** -2.250*** -2.648*** -2.581*** -2.153*** -3.403*** -3.310*** -2.952*** -4.313*** -4.178*** -3.952***
(0.253) (0.252) (0.258) (0.457) (0.455) (0.480) (0.463) (0.452) (0.458) (0.667) (0.653) (0.649) (0.798) (0.803) (0.750)
 of government spending -2.849* -3.053** -3.113** -5.116* -5.066* -5.250* -5.924** -6.585** -7.027** -8.096* -9.095** -9.816** -7.879 -10.397** -12.619**
(1.530) (1.541) (1.568) (2.706) (2.728) (2.844) (2.873) (2.844) (2.861) (4.367) (4.243) (4.187) (5.286) (5.295) (4.934)
 of GDP per capita 0.069* 0.067* 0.065* 0.053 0.057 0.069 0.025 0.014 0.006 -0.000 0.016 -0.020 -0.086 -0.074 -0.130
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.065) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.101) (0.098) (0.095) (0.114) (0.116) (0.107)
 of trade opennes 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014)
 of IFI 0.134*** 0.190** 0.292*** 0.510*** 0.218
(0.047) (0.079) (0.083) (0.148) (0.142)
 of GEQ 0.262*** 0.390*** 0.697*** 0.924*** 0.815***
(0.074) (0.148) (0.125) (0.186) (0.188)
-0.011 -0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.020 0.037 0.039 0.064 0.065 0.100* 0.111**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.058) (0.058) (0.052)
381 381 381 332 332 332 380 380 380 336 336 336 323 323 323











Table 4. Top Income Inequality Determinants: Difference GMM estimates. 
Notes: For all the estimates standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The Hansen test reports that under the null the overidentified restrictions are valid. The second order autocorrelation tests correspond 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Lagged top income 0.863** 0.683** 0.564*** 0.586*** 0.542*** 0.492*** 0.544* 0.535** 0.354 0.805*** 0.872** 0.753*** 0.556*** 0.682*** 0.842***
(0.421) (0.266) (0.215) (0.174) (0.149) (0.145) (0.282) (0.254) (0.223) (0.152) (0.387) (0.258) (0.162) (0.190) (0.120)
Log of population -0.211 -0.306 -0.285* -0.178 -0.242* -0.128* -0.122 -0.181** -0.130** -0.013 -0.092 -0.068* 0.047* 0.046 -0.009
(0.147) (0.214) (0.148) (0.112) (0.131) (0.066) (0.077) (0.080) (0.055) (0.024) (0.069) (0.037) (0.028) (0.034) (0.021)
Log top marginal tax -0.898*** -0.835*** -0.760** -0.615*** -0.619*** -0.587*** -0.457*** -0.465*** -0.413*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.229*** -0.184*** -0.177*** -0.188***
(0.320) (0.290) (0.299) (0.138) (0.127) (0.124) (0.097) (0.096) (0.088) (0.053) (0.051) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043)
Log of government spending 0.052 -0.133 -0.073 -0.124 -0.15 -0.155 -0.107 -0.144 -0.14 -0.012 -0.036 -0.016 0.027 0.069 0.085
(0.354) (0.328) (0.357) (0.174) (0.172) (0.156) (0.106) (0.108) (0.095) (0.067) (0.075) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068) (0.054)
Log of GDP per capita -0.299 -0.435 -0.392 -0.173 -0.331 -0.047 -0.058 -0.213 -0.055 0.017 -0.248 -0.167 0.149*** 0.127 -0.032
(0.490) (0.751) (0.565) (0.344) (0.370) (0.223) (0.178) (0.204) (0.160) (0.099) (0.285) (0.158) (0.054) (0.084) (0.066)
Log of trade opennes 0.205 0.194 0.186 0.001 -0.076
(0.303) (0.137) (0.141) (0.064) (0.058)
Log of IFI 0.253 0.169** 0.146*** 0.087 -0.033
(0.172) (0.068) (0.050) (0.057) (0.029)
Log of GEQ 0.186** 0.050* 0.091*** 0.054*** 0.007
(0.085) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.014)
Constant 3.953 6.789 6.646 2.914 5.795 2.08 1.606 4.298* 2.8 0.386 3.509 2.965** -0.179 -0.593 0.98
(5.341) (9.107) (6.947) (3.689) (4.403) (2.609) (2.034) (2.320) (1.810) (0.873) (2.453) (1.387) (0.482) (0.852) (0.687)
Number of observations 132 132 132 113 113 113 131 131 131 111 111 111 109 109 109
Number of instruments 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Hansen test 2.304 3.615 3.786 4.318 4.477 6.438 4.22 4.406 6.159 4.67 4.439 5.537 4.866 6.56 9.718
(p-value) (0.890) (0.729) (0.706) (0.634) (0.612) (0.376) (0.647) (0.622) (0.406) (0.587) (0.617) (0.477) (0.561) (0.363) (0.137)
Second order autocorrelation -0.048 0.009 0.105 -1.039 -0.967 -1.001 -1.255 -1.218 -1.05 -1.297 -1.406 -1.083 -1.857 -1.771 -1.905
(p-value) (0.962) (0.993) (0.917) (0.299) (0.334) (0.317) (0.210) (0.223) (0.294) (0.195) (0.160) (0.279) (0.063) (0.077) (0.057)
Independent variable





Table 5. Sample Partition according to GEQ Intensity. 
 
Notes: For all the estimates standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The Hansen test reports that under the null the overidentified restrictions are valid. The second order autocorrelation tests correspond 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged top income 0.855** 0.755*** 0.504* 0.410** 0.243 0.311 0.688*** 0.681*** 0.476*** 0.342** 0.190 0.214
(0.415) (0.237) (0.272) (0.167) (0.184) (0.191) (0.188) (0.155) (0.160) (0.155) (0.150) (0.171)
Log of population -0.157 -0.177 -0.266 -0.438 -0.242 -0.262 -0.074 -0.110 -0.136 -0.168 -0.087 -0.081
(0.139) (0.119) (0.182) (0.418) (0.235) (0.266) (0.081) (0.082) (0.108) (0.232) (0.136) (0.162)
Log top marginal tax -0.580*** -0.570*** -0.452** -1.409* -1.322** -1.388** -0.372*** -0.391*** -0.342*** -0.567** -0.534*** -0.537***
(0.138) (0.206) (0.192) (0.728) (0.620) (0.667) (0.117) (0.134) (0.113) (0.224) (0.164) (0.180)
Log of government spending 0.220 -0.012 0.100 -0.153 -0.196 -0.129 -0.021 -0.034 0.049 -0.186 -0.199* -0.193
(0.514) (0.545) (0.736) (0.243) (0.215) (0.256) (0.162) (0.169) (0.265) (0.123) (0.111) (0.121)
Log of GDP per capita -0.223 -0.304 -0.392 0.830 0.395 0.299 -0.030 -0.180 -0.178 0.447 0.266 0.255
(0.466) (0.493) (0.729) (1.356) (1.090) (1.215) (0.224) (0.287) (0.360) (0.607) (0.438) (0.504)
Log of trade opennes 0.461 -0.565 0.184 -0.202
(0.307) (0.515) (0.143) (0.280)
Log of IFI 0.289** -0.052 0.156 -0.009
(0.134) (0.178) (0.096) (0.080)
Log of GEQ 0.286*** -0.043 0.139*** -0.007
(0.082) (0.138) (0.042) (0.061)
Constant 2.322 4.564 7.260 -2.188 -1.994 -0.884 0.802 3.197 4.294 -1.208 -0.726 -0.737
(4.960) (5.946) (9.574) (8.782) (9.757) (10.370) (2.645) (3.514) (4.623) (2.888) (3.073) (3.411)
Number of observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 65 65 65
Number of instruments 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Hansen test 3.684 2.725 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.796 0.531 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000
(p-value) (0.719) (0.843) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999) (0.937) (0.997) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999)
Second order autocorrelation -1.280 -1.575 -1.634 0.976 0.920 0.901 -1.218 -1.285 -1.171 -0.255 -0.236 -0.250
(p-value) (0.200) (0.115) (0.102) (0.329) (0.357) (0.368) (0.223) (0.199) (0.242) (0.798) (0.814) (0.803)
GEQ Above Average GEQ Above Average
Top 0.1% Top 1%
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